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INTRODUCTION 
2006 was the most violent year in Iraq since the U.S.-led 
multinational force invasion in March of 2003. The February 2006 
bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque at Samarra by extremists was 
generally viewed as the catalyst for wide scale ethno-sectarian 
conflict throughout Iraq.1 Through 2006, U.S. troop deaths increased 
 * J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Yale College. The author served as a legal 
adviser to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq from January to November 2007. The 
views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent 
the views of the U.S. government. 
 1. See Robert F. Worth, Blast at Shiite Shrine Sets Off Sectarian Fury in Iraq, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at A1 (reporting that on February 22, 2006, a bomb 
destroyed the dome of the Golden Mosque of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, Iraq, 
one of Iraq’s most important Shi’ite shrines, as it is the burial site for two of the 
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to 3,003 and Iraqi ethno-sectarian civilian deaths are estimated to 
have increased to more than 150,000.2 American disaffection with 
the war also grew to its highest point since the original invasion.3 
The congressional midterm elections of 2006 in which the 
Democrats took control of Congress from the Republican Party were 
viewed as a repudiation of the war.4 The increased violence in Iraq 
and decreasing public support for the war led to calls from the public 
and the new congressional majority leadership for President George 
W. Bush to draw down troops and modify the Iraq war strategy.5 
Despite these calls, President Bush did not pursue a strategy that 
involved the drawdown of troops. Instead, he approved a strategy 
twelve imams revered by mainstream Shiites). The bombing led to a day of 
sectarian fury, where mobs retaliated and attacked twenty-seven Sunni mosques. 
Id. Iraqi leaders blamed the attack on a terrorist plan to exploit sectarian rifts. Id. 
 2. See Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org/oif (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2008) (cataloging the U.S. troop casualty numbers as released by the 
Department of Defense); HANNAH FISCHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
IRAQI CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ESTIMATES 4 (May 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22537.pdf (providing various estimates of 
Iraqi civilian deaths for differing time periods, while indicating that no concrete 
numbers exist for a definitive count of Iraqi civilian deaths). 
 3. See Susan Page, USA More Pessimistic on Iraq War, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 
2006, at 1A (reporting that a late 2006 USA Today/Gallup poll revealed that 
“Americans are increasingly pessimistic about the war and want most U.S. troops 
withdrawn within a year . . . [and that] 76% [of] those surveyed say Iraq is in a 
civil war,” in addition to a significant majority of Americans doubting the value of 
the Iraq war). 
 4. See Dan Balz & Jon Cohen, Independent Voters Favor Democrats by 2 to 1 
in Poll, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2006, at A1 (reporting that public opinion polling 
conducted days before the election showed that the war in Iraq was considered the 
most important election issue by the largest segment of the public); Exit Polls: 
Bush, Iraq Key to Outcome, CNN.COM, Nov. 8, 2006, www.cnn.com/2006/ 
POLITICS/11/08/election.why/index.html (indicating that exit polls showed that 
large segments of the public either disapproved of the war or wanted the 
withdrawal of troops within some time frame, and that both of these groups broke 
heavily for the Democrats). 
 5. See Adam Nagourney & Megan Thee, With Election Driven by Iraq, Voters 
Want New Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2006, at A1 (stating that “a substantial 
majority of Americans expect Democrats to reduce or end American military 
involvement in Iraq if they win control of Congress”); cf. Nancy Pelosi, Op-Ed, 
Bringing the War to an End is My Highest Priority as Speaker, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-nancy-pelosi/bringing-the-war-
to-an-en_b_34393.html (writing one day after her selection as Speaker-designate, 
Nancy Pelosi posted an entry on an internet website, expressing her commitment to 
“bringing the war to an end”). 
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that increased U.S. troop levels and specified benchmark measures to 
assess the Iraqi government’s success at achieving political 
rapprochement among its different factions. This Article will 
describe the U.S. national security strategy in Iraq during 2007 and 
various assessments of the success of that strategy. 
I. NEW WAY FORWARD 
Shortly after the fall 2006 midterm congressional elections, the 
President initiated a formal internal review of Iraq policy among his 
national security agencies to obtain policy options on a way ahead in 
Iraq.6 In January 2007, President Bush delivered his long awaited 
speech on Iraq, The New Way Forward.7 In the speech, President 
Bush acknowledged that despite the 2005 national elections in Iraq 
and the formation of a new Iraqi national unity government8 in 2006, 
 6. See Robin Wright, Bush Initiates Iraq Policy Review Separate From Baker 
Group’s, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2006, at A16 (reporting that on November 14, 
2006, President Bush launched an internal policy review among his national 
security agencies with the goal of having them recommend options on future plans, 
and that the release of the internal policy review was scheduled for mid-December, 
to coincide with the release of the independent, bipartisan Iraq Study Group 
Report); President George W. Bush, President Bush Meets with Cabinet (Nov. 9, 
2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061109.html (stating 
that one day after the Democratic midterm election victory, the President accepted 
the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and relaying the 
President’s announcement that he was “open to any idea or suggestion that will 
help us . . . ensur[e] that Iraq’s democratic government succeeds”). 
 7. President George W. Bush, The New Way Forward in Iraq (Jan. 10, 2007), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-7.html 
(acknowledging that the situation in Iraq was “unacceptable” to himself, as well as 
to the American people). 
 8. Id. (taking responsibility for the failures in Iraq, but asserting that to 
succeed, the true path lies with the plans of the Iraqi government). The unity 
government was formed based upon provisions in the Iraqi Constitution designed 
to to create a power sharing structure within the Prime Minister and President’s 
Office supported by Iraq’s various sectarian groups. See IRAQI CONSTITUTION art. 
139 (requiring the Prime Minister to have two Deputy Prime Ministers during the 
first national electoral term of the Council of Representatives) and IRAQI 
CONSTITUTION art. 138 (creating a “Presidency Council” for the first electoral term 
of the Council of Representatives, during which period the powers of the President 
are shared by a tripartite Presidency Council, consisting of a President and two 
Vice Presidents—during 2007, the President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, was a Kurd 
and his two vice-presidents Adil Abd al-Mahdi and Tariq al-Hashimi, respectively, 
were Shi’a and Sunni); see also Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, Constitutional 
Politics and Text In the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 
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Iraq had not made the security and political gains that he had hoped 
for. He stated that the security environment had deteriorated 
significantly, largely as a result of the bombing of the Samarra 
mosque.9 The increase in sectarian conflict and deterioration of 
security ran counter to the political reconciliation that he had hoped 
would occur after the formation of the national unity government. 
Against this backdrop, President Bush determined that U.S. troop 
levels should be increased to provide greater security in order to 
facilitate greater political reconciliation at the national level.10 The 
strategy was premised on the notion that an increased security 
situation would create the breathing space for the Iraqi government 
to move forward with key political compromises. The success of the 
new strategy, therefore, would be fueled by U.S. investment in troops 
and treasure, but ultimately measured by the Iraqi government’s 
success in delivering on specific benchmarks. 
II. THE SURGE 
The temporary troop increase, which became commonly known as 
“the surge,” was based upon President Bush’s determination that 
increased security, particularly in the area of Baghdad—where eighty 
percent of the sectarian violence occurred—was “the most urgent 
priority for success in Iraq.”11 President Bush stated that past efforts 
to secure Baghdad had failed because there were not enough 
American and Iraqi troops to secure neighborhoods after they had 
been cleared of terrorists and insurgents and because the troops were 
too restricted in the actions that they could take.12 He announced that 
the new plan developed by his military commanders addressed these 
concerns. The plan would put the Iraqis in a lead position in 
improving security around Baghdad. Key to the new plan was the 
appointment of a new Iraqi military commander in Baghdad who 
FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 910-15 (2006) (discussing the genesis of these 
constitutional provisions during the constitutional drafting process). 
 9. See Bush, supra note 7 (accusing Sunni insurgents of destroying the 
Golden Mosque to provoke a Shi’a response). 
 10. See id. (reasoning that an increase in American troops would lead to greater 
security in Baghdad, which in turn would make reconciliation possible). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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would oversee the implementation of the plan.13 The Iraqi 
government would deploy eighteen Iraqi Army and National police 
brigades across nine of Baghdad’s districts. These forces would work 
in concert with the local police to conduct patrols, set up 
checkpoints, and gain the trust of Baghdad residents. 
President Bush noted that the Iraqis would need additional support 
from the United States to carry out their new security plan in 
Baghdad. For this reason he committed more than 30,000 additional 
American troops to Iraq, with the majority—five brigades—going to 
Baghdad, increasing U.S. troop levels in Iraq from 132,000 to over 
160,000.14 President Bush noted that this plan would succeed where 
earlier plans to secure Baghdad had not because the Americans and 
Iraqis would have the troop levels to hold the areas that had been 
cleared of insurgents and terrorists and because of the Iraqi Prime 
Minister’s pledge that political and sectarian influence would not 
prevent troops from going into neighborhoods that were fueling the 
sectarian violence.15
III. POLITICAL BENCHMARKS 
In his January address, the President noted that a successful 
strategy in Iraq must extend beyond military operations and that the 
United States would hold the Iraqi government to benchmarks that it 
had previously announced as indicators of political reconciliation.16 
These benchmarks included holding new provincial elections, the 
completion of a de-Ba’athification reform law, the establishment of a 
process for constitutional review, and the completion of a 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. Although President Bush announced that 20,000 additional troops 
would be deployed in his speech, ultimately 30,000 additional troops were 
deployed as part of the surge, bringing troop levels to more that 160,000 at the 
peak of the surge in the summer of 2007. See Tim Cocks, U.S. Military Says Iraq 
Troop “Surge” Has Ended, REUTERS, July 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSL22490131. 
 15. See Bush, supra note 7 (warning that the Iraqi government must keep this 
and other promises to maintain the support of the American and Iraqi peoples). 
 16. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1195, SECURING 
STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MET MOST 
LEGISLATIVE, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC BENCHMARKS 1 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter 
GAO STUDY] (noting that the benchmarks were derived from commitments 
articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006). 
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hydrocarbon sharing law.17 The ultimate goal of “political 
reconciliation” was viewed as the coming together of Iraq’s various 
sectarian groups—the Shi’a, Kurds, Sunni, and other minority ethnic 
and religious groups—to reach political common ground on issues of 
national importance to all Iraqis.18 Provincial elections were seen as 
particularly important to the Iraqi public because many Sunnis had 
boycotted the earlier national elections.19 Provincial elections were 
viewed as an opportunity to provide the Sunnis with greater political 
representation at the provincial level, increase Sunni participation 
and commitment to a democratic form of government, and 
undermine support for Sunni insurgent groups that opposed the new 
national government. The completion of a de-Ba’athification law 
was intended to help re-integrate thousands of disaffected former low 
level Ba’athists, largely Sunni, back into national civil servant 
positions.20 As many of the difficult political issues that arose during 
the constitutional drafting process (such as territorial claims over 
Kirkuk and other disputed areas) had been deferred during the 
original drafting of the constitution,21 constitutional review was also 
seen as a mechanism through which the various sectarian groups 
could make political compromises in working towards a common 
objective. Finally, the issue of the distribution of Iraq’s oil resources 
was of great import to Shi’a, Sunnis and Kurds throughout the 
country. Concluding a law that would provide for the distribution of
 17. See Bush, supra note 7 (highlighting these key benchmarks in announcing 
the New Way Forward strategy). 
 18. See GAO STUDY, supra note 16, at 1 (noting that the levels of violence in 
2006 undermined efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling sectarian 
tensions and that the new U.S. strategy was designed to provide the Iraqi 
government with the time and space needed to help address reconciliation among 
the various segments of Iraqi society). 
 19. See id. at 31 (articulating that the Sunni boycott resulted in Shi’a and Kurd 
provincial councils representing provinces with majority Sunni populations, and 
that new provincial elections would rectify this imbalance). 
 20. See id. at 23-24 (noting that much of the Iraqi technocratic class had been 
removed from government under the de-Ba’athification process, angering many 
Sunni Arabs, and that U.S. officials sought to differentiate Ba’athist officials who 
had committed human rights violations, from those who had merely been members 
of the Ba’ath party). 
 21. See id. at 19 (noting that several contentious issues were not resolved in the 
October 2005 constitutional referendum). 
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oil resources nationally was viewed as one of the most significant 
issues requiring political reconciliation at the national level.22
IV. CONGRESSIONAL BENCHMARKS 
On May 25, 2007, several months after he announced his new Iraq 
strategy, President Bush signed into law a troop funding provision 
that included eighteen congressional benchmarks to measure 
progress in Iraq. The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina 
Recovery and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act23 required the 
President to provide two reports to Congress assessing the status of 
each of the eighteen benchmarks contained in the Act.24
Citing President Bush’s statement in his January speech that 
“America will change our approach to help the Iraqi government as it 
moves to meet these benchmarks”25 and noting that significant time 
had passed since the January address, Congress stated in the law that 
it must have adequate reports of the Government of Iraq’s progress 
towards meeting various political, military and economic 
benchmarks to perform its constitutional oversight responsibilities.26 
Through the passage of this law, Congress effectively enshrined 
President Bush’s new Iraq strategy into law. Congress specifically 
mandated that: 
the United States strategy in Iraq, hereafter, shall be 
conditioned on the Iraqi government meeting benchmarks, as 
told to members of Congress by the President, the Secretary 
of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and reflected in the Iraqi Government’s 
commitments to the United States, and to the international 
community.27
In addition to the political benchmarks announced by President Bush 
in January, the law listed several other benchmarks to be considered 
in the formulation of U.S. strategy in Iraq moving forward.28 The law 
 22. Id. at 25. 
 23. Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007). 
 24. Id. § 1314(b)(2)(A), (D). 
 25. Id. § 1314(a)(9). 
 26. Id. § 1314(a)(12). 
 27. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(A). 
 28. See id. § 1314(b)(1)(A)(i)–(xviii) (including goals ranging from the 
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required the President to report to Congress on the Iraqi 
Government’s success in meeting the enumerated benchmarks and 
required the President to report on any revisions that would need to 
be made to the political, economic, regional, and military 
components of the Iraq strategy should specific benchmarks not be 
met.29
While separate draft legislation considered by Congress would 
have directed the redeployment of troops and prevented funding for 
any troop increase,30 the legislation ultimately passed by Congress 
and signed by President Bush did not contain explicit troop 
withdrawal requirements. Congress, however, included a provision 
that would require U.S. redeployment of troops if the sovereign Iraqi 
government reached consensus on troop withdrawal and called for 
such withdrawal in a resolution.31 The law also contained a provision 
which stated that none of the funds made available for Iraq could be 
expended unless the President certified that each of the benchmarks 
had been met.32 The President could waive that restriction by 
submitting a written certification with a detailed report containing 
the actions that the U.S. government was taking to bring the Iraqi 
government into compliance with the benchmarks.33 The waiver 
provision ultimately removed any automatic punitive financial 
impact upon the Iraqi government should the benchmarks not be met. 
The law required the President to deliver a first status report by 
July 15 and a second status report by September 15, 2007.34 
Congress directed that the second status report be delivered along 
with closed and open session congressional testimony by the U.S. 
implementation of amnesty legislation to the reduction of sectarian violence). 
 29. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(B). 
 30. H.R. 2237, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007) (directing that the redeployment of 
troops begin ninety days after the legislation’s passage and that the redeployment 
be completed within 180 days of passage, and prohibiting the use of any funds for 
an increase in troops beyond the level in country on January 1, 2007). The 
provision ultimately failed by a vote of 171-255. See Final Vote Result for Roll 
Call 330, http://clerk.house.gov/cgi-bin/vote.asp?year=2007&rollnumber=330. 
 31. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007) 
§ 1314(d). 
 32. Id. § 1314(c)(1). 
 33. Id. § 1314(c)(2). 
 34. Id. § 1314(b)(2)(A), (D). 
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Ambassador to Iraq and the Multi-National Force Commander.35 
Congress also directed that two independent assessments be 
completed—the first by the Comptroller General of the General 
Accounting Office on the Iraqi government’s ability to meet the 
various benchmarks and the second by a private sector contractor 
hired by the Department of Defense to assess the Iraqi Security 
Forces’ preparation to take over security responsibility within Iraq.36
V. BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORTS 
On July 12, 2007, the White House submitted its initial report to 
Congress, containing updates on all eighteen benchmarks.37 The 
measures included the original four benchmarks announced by 
President Bush in January: passage of a de-Ba’athification reform 
law, constitutional review, a hydrocarbons sharing law, and 
provincial elections.38 Congress further required the President to 
evaluate some of Iraq’s legislative action,39 security related 
progress,40 political stability,41 and economic self-sufficiency.42
 35. Id. § 1314(b)(3). 
 36. Id. § 1314(e). 
 37. See WHITE HOUSE, INITIAL BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT 9-25 (July 
12, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/FinalBenchmark 
Report.pdf [hereinafter INITIAL BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT]. 
 38. Id. at 9-13. 
 39. Id. at 11-15 (enumerating legislative benchmarks including the passage of 
an amnesty law and legislation on the formation of autonomous regions, as well as 
legislation establishing a disarmament program). 
 40. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007) 
§ 1314(b)(1)(A)(viii)-(xv) (requiring the President to report to Congress regarding 
Iraq’s security situation, such as the establishment of various committees to further 
the Baghdad Security Plan, the provision of three Iraqi brigades to assist in 
Baghdad operations, the provision to Iraqi military commanders the necessary 
authority to execute the security plan, ensuring that the Iraqi military in charge of 
the operations applied the law fairly to all parties, ensuring that the Baghdad 
Security Plan did not allow outlaws to escape apprehension, reducing sectarian 
violence and militia control of local security, establishing the joint security stations 
previously planned for Baghdad, and increasing the number of functioning and 
independently operating Iraqi Security Force units). 
 41. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(A)(xvi), (xviii) (dictating that political authorities should 
not undermine or make any false accusations against the Iraqi Security Force, and 
ensuring that minority political parties have their rights protected). 
 42. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(A)(xvii) (requiring that Iraq spend $10 billion of its own 
revenues for reconstruction projects while at the same time providing essential 
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Out of the eighteen total benchmarks, the President’s first report 
(July 2007) stated that the Government of Iraq had made satisfactory 
progress toward achieving nine of the benchmarks.43 The 
benchmarks in which the Iraqi Government had made significant 
progress included: forming a Constitutional Review Committee; 
enacting and implementing a regions law; establishing the Iraqi High 
Electoral Commission (but not a provincial elections law); 
establishing political, economic, and service committees in support 
of the Baghdad Security Plan; providing three trained and ready Iraqi 
brigades to support Baghdad operations; ensuring the Baghdad 
Security Plan does not provide a safe haven for any outlaws; 
reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq (but not eliminating 
militia control of local security); establishing the planned joint 
security stations in Baghdad neighborhoods; increasing the number 
of Iraqi Security Force units capable of operating independently; 
ensuring the rights of minority political parties are protected in the 
legislature; and allocating funds to ministries and provinces (but not 
spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenue).44
The report noted that the New Way Forward, embodying the 
current U.S. strategy, required the U.S. and Iraqi governments to 
fully commit toward a common goal: “a democratic Iraq that can 
govern, defend, and sustain itself, and be an ally in the War on 
Terror.”45 The Report characterized the New Way Forward as an 
acknowledgement that: 
in response to the upsurge in sectarian violence in 2006, it 
was necessary for Coalition Forces to temporarily play a 
greater role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in 
securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace 
Iraqi efforts to provide security, but to help provide the 
necessary time and space with which the Iraqi Government 
can continue to build its own capacity, can intensify efforts 
against the accelerants of violence . . . and can meaningfully
services fairly to citizens). 
 43. See generally INITIAL BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 37 
(indicating that the President felt that some progress was being made in all respects 
but that as of July 2007 the progress on half of the eighteen benchmarks was 
unsatisfactory). 
 44. Id. at 9-25. 
 45. Id. at 1. 
JOHNSON_TO PRINT.DOC 12/8/2008  10:35:57 AM 
2008] 2007 IN IRAQ 259 
 
address the all-important issue of reconciliation among the 
various segments of Iraqi society.46
The report further noted that the high levels of violence in 2006 
threatened political reconciliation efforts and the legitimacy of the 
coalition forces and Iraqi government by “fueling sectarian tensions, 
[and] emboldening extremists.”47 The report concluded that amid 
such violence, Iraqi leaders had difficulty making the “compromises 
necessary to foster reconciliation.”48
On September 14, 2007, the White House released the second 
benchmark report to Congress.49 In the report, the White House 
noted it was assessing whether given all of the facts and 
circumstances, the “present trend data demonstrates a positive 
trajectory, which is tracking toward satisfactory accomplishment [of 
the benchmarks] in the near term.”50 Some benchmarks with multiple 
elements showed mixed progress, as Iraq had only met some 
elements of the final benchmark. The report noted that its assessment 
metric differed from that of the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office’s [G.A.O.] August 2007 report (discussed below) which 
determined whether the Iraqi government had met each benchmark 
and the status of achievement.51 Further, the September White House 
report was based on information available through September 
whereas the G.A.O. report was based on information available 
through the end of July. The September assessment recognized 
further progress in the same areas noted in the July assessment, as 
well as in some additional areas.52 Although no de-Ba’athification 
reform law had yet been passed, the White House now determined 
that the Government of Iraq had made satisfactory progress toward 
enacting and implementing de-Ba’athification legislation, based 
upon the fact that the leaders of Iraq’s five major political groups had 
 46. Id. at 2. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. WHITE HOUSE, BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT (Sept. 14, 2007), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070914.pdf 
[hereinafter SECOND BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT]. 
 50. Id. at 10. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. (summarizing that the current report assesses seven benchmarks as 
not satisfactory and nine benchmarks as satisfactory). 
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agreed in principle on draft legislation aimed at re-integrating former 
Ba’athists back into the government at an August political leaders 
summit.53 Although legislation had yet to be passed, this agreement 
was viewed as a sign of growing political accommodation between 
the Shi’a and Sunni communities. Similarly, the September report 
also determined that since July, satisfactory progress had been made 
toward establishing a provincial powers law. Although legislation 
had not yet been passed, the Iraqi political leadership had reached an 
agreement at the August summit on a draft law defining provincial 
authorities.54
In the September report, the White House also determined that 
partial progress had been made in two additional security 
benchmarks. The report assessed that the Iraqi government had made 
progress toward giving Iraqi commanders the necessary authority to 
execute the New Way Forward strategy and to make the decisions, 
both tactical and operational, to pursue extremists; however, the 
White House also assessed that there had not been “satisfactory 
progress towards [eliminating] political intervention by leaders 
throughout the chain of command.”55 By September, the Prime 
Minister had granted the Iraqi and coalition forces all of the 
necessary authorities to go after insurgents and militias but political 
influence and sectarian behavior at various levels within the Iraqi 
Security Forces [ISF] remained.56 In describing the nature of 
sectarian influence within the ISF, the White House reported that the 
Prime Minister and senior Iraqi commanders were aware of the long 
term security threat posed by militia extremists both in and out of the 
ISF.57 As positive steps, the White House pointed to actions that the 
Prime Minister had taken in August to remove sectarian Shi’a 
commanders within the ISF in addition to targeting Shi’a militia 
groups.58 The White House also noted that seventeen out of twenty-
 53. See id. at 12 (reporting that in mid-August 2007, the leaders of Iraq’s five 
major political parties met to discuss and reach political agreement on a number of 
difficult, high priority political issues, including the draft de-Ba’athification 
legislation). 
 54. Id. at 12-14. 
 55. Id. at 19. 
 56. See id. (pointing to various methods possibly being used to replace 
effective personnel simply because they were Sunni). 
 57. Id. at 18. 
 58. Id. 
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seven battalion commanders in the National Police had been 
removed from duty because of suspicions that they had engaged in 
sectarian activity since the beginning of the year.59 Although Iraqi 
commanders continued to make choices about which operations to 
undertake in part out of fear of being replaced for political or 
sectarian reasons, the Prime Minister’s actions against fellow Shi’a 
commanders and groups were viewed as encouraging.60
The White House also reported in September that while the 
government of Iraq was now making satisfactory progress toward 
ensuring that the Iraqi Army is providing “even-handed enforcement 
of the law,” the Iraqi police had not made similar progress.61 The 
White House reported that individual ISF units that worked with 
coalition forces generally acted in a responsible manner and that ISF 
operations against insurgent cells appeared to target both Sunni and 
Shi’a elements.62 However, the report pointedly noted that some 
police units outside of Coalition supervision gravitated toward “old 
habits of sectarianism.”63
Finally, as of September 2007, the Government of Iraq had failed 
to make satisfactory progress toward achieving a number of 
benchmarks, including enacting a hydrocarbons sharing law, 
enacting an elections law, establishing a date for provincial elections, 
enacting an amnesty law, establishing a strong militia disarmament 
program, increasing the number of ISF units operating 
independently, and ensuring that political authorities were not 
undermining or making false accusations against ISF members.64
VI. SEPTEMBER TESTIMONY 
On September 10 and 11, 2007, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and General David Petraeus, the 
Multinational Force Commander, testified before Congress about 
how the US Mission and Coalition forces were performing in the 
 
 59. Id. at 19. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 20. 
 62. Id. at 19. 
 63. Id. at 20. 
 64. Id. at 10-27. 
JOHNSON_TO PRINT.DOC 12/8/2008  10:35:57 AM 
262 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:249 
 
implementation of the New Way Forward’s goals of increased 
security and political reconciliation. In Ambassador Crocker’s view: 
It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is—and will remain for 
some time—a traumatized society . . . . Iraqis are facing some 
of the most profound political, economic and security 
challenges imaginable . . . . Some of the more promising 
political developments at the national level are neither 
measured in benchmarks nor visible to those far from 
Baghdad . . . . Our country, however, has come to associate 
progress on national reconciliation as meaning the passage of 
key pieces of legislation. There is logic to this, as the 
legislation we are urging the Iraqis to produce does . . . have 
to do with the question of how to share power and resources 
among Iraq’s many communities . . . . I do believe that Iraq’s 
leaders have the will to tackle the country’s pressing 
problems, although it will take longer than we originally 
anticipated because of the environment and the gravity of the 
issues before them.65
Ambassador Crocker discussed various central concerns to the future 
of Iraq, such as de-Ba’athification reform and provincial powers 
legislation.66 While he was not able to report that any of these 
particular benchmark measures had been completed, he discussed the 
significance of the resolution of those issues to the Iraqi people and 
the significant debates that party leaders were having about each of 
those issues.67 He was encouraged that after much preparatory work 
and many days of intensive meetings, Iraq’s five leading national 
figures from the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish communities agreed on 
draft legislation addressing de-Ba’athification reform and provincial 
powers on August 26, 2007.68
 65. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, 
Statement Before a Joint Hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the House Committee on Armed Services 3-4 (Sept. 10, 2007), available at 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/cro091007.pdf. 
 66. See id. at 3-4 (characterizing the debates surrounding the oil and revenue 
sharing laws, de-ba’aathification, and the balance of provincial powers as akin to 
those surrounding the American civil rights movement or struggle over states 
rights). 
 67. See id. (asserting that the issue is whether Iraq has the capability to resolve 
these fundamental problems). 
 68. Id. at 4. 
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Ambassador Crocker concluded his testimony observing that: 
2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to 
unraveling politically, economically, and in security terms. 
2007 has brought improvement. Enormous challenges remain 
. . . . The changes to our strategy last January—the surge—
have helped change the dynamics in Iraq for the better . . . . 
We have given Iraqis the time and space to reflect on what 
sort of country they want . . . . Whether Iraq reaches its 
potential is of course ultimately the product of Iraqi 
decisions.69
At the same hearings, General Petraeus reported that the majority of 
the military objectives of the surge were being met.70 Furthermore, 
he believed that the United States would be able to reduce its forces 
to pre-surge levels by the summer of 2008 without jeopardizing the 
security gains that had been made.71 Citing several statistics about 
the changing security enviornment in Iraq during the surge offensive, 
General Petraeus showed that sectarian violence peaked in December 
2006 and since then, civilian deaths of all categories had decreased 
by forty-five percent, civilian deaths in Baghdad had decreased by 
seventy percent, ethno-sectarian deaths throughout Iraq decreased by 
fifty-five percent, and deaths in Baghdad decreased by eighty 
percent.72 General Petraeus also described gains in the security 
situation in Anbar Province, fueled by local Iraqi leaders allying 
themselves with coalition forces against Al Qaeda; a decrease in the 
number of car bombings throughout Iraq; and significant progress in 
the targeting of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as Shi’a militia 
extremists.73
In his congressional testimony, General Petraeus also made 
several observations about the status of the Iraqi Security Forces, 
stating that “[d]espite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate 
logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of 
 69. Id. at 8. 
 70. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, 
Statement Before a Joint Hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the House Committee on Armed Services 1 (Sept. 10-11, 2007) available at 
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC091007/Petraeus_Testimony091007.pdf. 
 71. Id. at 7. 
 72. Id. at 3. 
 73. Id. at 4. 
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qualified . . . officers, Iraqi units [were] engaged around the 
country.”74 At that time, there were nearly 140 battalions of various 
Iraqi military forces and police units in the fight, and the vast 
majority of those could lead operations75 and a number of Iraqi units 
were operating throughout the country with a minimum of coalition 
assistance.76 General Petraeus summarized several recommendations 
that he had made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the future military 
strategy in Iraq, emphasizing the need for coalition forces to secure 
the population of Iraq and transition responsibilities to Iraqi 
institutions and forces quickly, “without rushing to failure.”77 
General Petraeus noted that two important components remained the 
development of the ISF while at the same time advancing the 
counterinsurgency strategy, all the while advancing the responsibility 
of Iraqis in the effort.78 As part of this strategy, General Petraeus 
recommended a drawdown of surge troops to the pre-surge levels by 
mid-July 2008.79 He stated that he would revisit further rates for 
reductions beyond pre-surge levels in mid-March 2008, when he 
would have “a better feel for the security situation, the improvements 
in the capability of the Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation.”80
VII. G.A.O. BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT 
In addition to testimony from Ambassador Crocker and General 
Petraeus before Congress, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, 
Katrina Recovery and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act also 
called for an independent assessment of the Iraqi government’s 
success in achieving the various political benchmarks and another 
assessment of the Iraqi government’s preparation to take over 
security responsibility in the country.81 The first report, completed by 
 74. Id. at 5. 
 75. See id. (indicating that ninety-five percent of the battalions were ready to 
take the lead, but that they would require coalition support). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 6. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 7 (emphasizing that continued reductions would continue beyond 
summer-2008 reductions to pre-surge levels, but that establishing a pace for those 
reductions would be premature). 
 80. See id. at 7. 
 81. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 § 1314(e)(1). 
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the Comptroller General of the United States as the head of the 
G.A.O., determined that Iraq had largely failed to meet the 
benchmarks called for in the legislation.82 As of September 2007, the 
Government of Iraq fully met only three of the benchmarks and 
partially met four of the benchmarks.83 G.A.O. determined that Iraq 
had not made substantial progress towards achieving eleven of the 
eighteen benchmarks.84 G.A.O. concluded that the Government of 
Iraq had only completed one of the eight legislative benchmarks—
the protection of minority political parties and partially met the 
benchmark of establishing a regions law, since a regions law had 
been passed but would not take effect until April 2008. The report 
also noted that the government had not enacted legislation on de-
Ba’athification reform, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, 
amnesty, or militia disarmament.85 In reporting on the G.A.O. study 
to Congress, the Comptroller General concluded that as of September 
2007, the Iraq government had failed to fulfill its commitments “to 
advance legislative, security, and economic measures that would 
advance national reconciliation among Iraq’s warring factions.”86 In 
the Comptroller General’s view “the polarization of Iraq’s major 
sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Shi’a factions diminishes 
the stability of Iraq’s governing coalition and its potential to enact 
legislation needed for sectarian reconciliation.”87 The Comptroller 
General also reported that violence remained high in Iraq and that 
G.A.O. faced difficulty in assessing whether sectarian violence in 
Iraq had decreased since it was unable to measure whether the 
perpetrators’ intentions were sectarian in nature.88
 82. See GAO STUDY, supra note 16, at 2. 
 83. Id. at 3. 
 84. Id. at 4-5. 
 85. Id. 
 86. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony 
Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 12, available at http://www.gao. 
gov/htext/d071222t.html. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 9 (citing the administration’s July 2007 report, which indicated a 
decrease in sectarian violence but “acknowledged that precise measurements vary, 
and it was too early to determine if the decrease would be sustainable”). 
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VIII. INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE IRAQI 
SECURITY FORCES 
The report on the Iraqi Security forces conducted by General Jones 
USMC (ret.) and the Independent Commission was similarly critical 
of the Government of Iraq’s success in implementing the New Way 
Forward.89 Congress mandated that an independent commission 
assess the readiness of Iraq’s military and police forces to maintain 
the territorial integrity of Iraq, deny safe haven to international 
terrorists, bring greater security to the country’s provinces in the next 
twelve to eighteen months, and bring an end to sectarian violence to 
achieve national reconciliation.90 The commission was also directed 
to report on the overall capabilities of the ISF, including their 
training levels, equipment, and intelligence abilities as well as 
whether continued assistance by U.S. troops would likely help the 
ISF’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities identified by Congress to 
ensure security within the country.91 The independent commission 
determined that all of the Iraqi Armed Forces were increasingly 
“capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security 
of Iraq” and that the Iraqi police were improving.92 The authors also 
determined that the Iraqi Security Forces would continue to rely 
upon the coalition forces over the next twelve to eighteen months, 
and that the ISF would not have the power to protect Iraq from 
external threats independent of coalition support.93 The Commission 
was also very critical of the Ministry of Interior, which has 
responsibility for the local and national police and the border 
enforcement department, describing it as a “ministry in name 
only.”94 The report determined that the ministry was dysfunctional, 
 89. See REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES 
OF IRAQ 8 (Sept. 6, 2008) (evaluating the domestic security forces in Iraq as being 
unable to meet the goals set for them within the upcoming twelve to eighteen 
months). 
 90. U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 § 1314(e)(2)(i). 
 91. Id. § 1314(e)(2)(ii)-(iii). 
 92. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES OF 
IRAQ, supra note 89, at 46. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 17. 
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sectarian, and lacked effective leadership.95 In the commission’s 
view, the fundamental flaws within the system posed a serious 
obstacle to achieving the “levels of readiness, capability, and 
effectiveness” necessary for internal security and stability in Iraq.96
IX. APRIL 2008 TESTIMONY 
During their September 2007 testimony, Ambassador Crocker and 
General Petraeus reported that the President asked them to provide 
Congress and the American people with a further update on the 
security and political environment in Iraq in March 2008.97 On April 
8 and 9, 2008 Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus updated 
Congress on the security environment and the Government of Iraq’s 
achievements in the area of political reconciliation.98
In his testimony, Ambassador Crocker provided a new assessment 
of the political, economic, and diplomatic progress of the Iraqi 
government.99 Ambassador Crocker observed that a number of 
significant accomplishments by the Iraqi government since 
September 2007 indicated a positive trend with respect to political 
reconciliation. He stated that “[i]mmense challenges remain and 
progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow, but there is 
progress.”100 He noted that at the national level, the Iraqi parliament 
had passed some key pieces of legislation, including some of the 
benchmark measures. Since September the Parliament had passed a 
pension law that extends benefits to individuals who had been denied 
benefits because of their service under Saddam’s regime, a de-
Ba’athification reform law (the Accountability and Justice Law), and 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See SECOND BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 3 
(indicating the assessment is to address mission progress, adjustments to military 
resources, adjustments to economic assistance, regional and international 
contributions, political and security initiatives, and institutional adjustments within 
the USG to better support the missions in Iraq). 
 98. See Karen DeYoung & Thomas E. Ricks, Frustrated Senators See No Exit 
Signs, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2008, at A1. 
 99. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, 
Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee (Apr. 8, 2008), available 
at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2008/April/Crocker%2004-08-08.pdf 
[hereinafter Crocker Statement, April 2008]. 
 100. Id. at 1. 
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an amnesty law.101 Each of these pieces of legislation were viewed as 
key accomplishments in the area of reconciliation—the de-
Ba’athification reform legislation enabled an increasing number of 
civil servants under the prior regime to seek government jobs and the 
amnesty law was intended to enable certain individuals to move 
forward in Iraqi society without being criminally detained, 
notwithstanding their former activities as combatants. The Iraqi 
parliament also passed a provincial powers law defining the 
relationship between the federal and provincial governments and set 
the date of October 1, 2008 for provincial elections.102 As the Iraqi 
Parliament had begun to pass key pieces of legislation, Ambassador 
Crocker observed that as an institution, the Council of 
Representatives (COR) was maturing and had begun to resolve tough 
problems in a practical way. He noted that “while [Iraqi] politics still 
have a sectarian bent and basis, cross-sectarian coalitions have 
formed around issues, and sectarian political groupings which often 
were barriers to progress have become more flexible.”103
Ambassador Crocker also noted that the Iraqi unity government 
continued to face a number of challenges. He believed that a 
reinvigorated cabinet was necessary for political balance and to 
improve the delivery of services to the Iraqi people.104 He also noted 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 3. Although the provincial powers law, which established a provincial 
elections date of October 1, 2008 passed the Council of Representatives and was 
signed into law by the Presidency Council on March 19, a key elections law 
defining the electoral framework had not yet passed the Iraqi parliament. There 
was concern that an elections law would not pass the Council of Representatives 
and receive the ratification of the Presidency Council in time for provincial 
elections in 2008. See Erica Goode & Richard A. Oppel, Official’s Shift Raises 
Hope for Iraq Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at A12 (reporting that the 
legislation was initially rejected by the Presidency Council, but subsequently 
approved by Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi after meeting with U.S. Vice 
President Dick Cheney in Iraq); Ned Parker & Caesar Ahmed, Iraqi Election Law 
Remains Stalled, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at A3 (explaining that failure to reach 
an agreement by winter 2008 on provincial powers could delay elections to 
December 2008). 
 103. See Crocker Statement, April 2008, supra note 99, at 3. 
 104. Id. at 6. At the time of Crocker’s testimony, a bloc of Sadrist (Shia) and 
Tawafuq (Sunni) had boycotted the Iraqi parliament and the Council of Ministers 
(Iraq’s multi-sectarian cabinet). The boycott included Sunni Deputy Prime 
Minister Zobaie, who was responsible for overseeing the delivery of basic services 
to Iraqis. Since the time of Ambassador Crocker’s testimony, Tawafuq (also know 
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that the Iraqi government would need to confront significant issues, 
including corruption, disputed internal boundaries, the return of 
refugees and internally displaced persons, and the protection of the 
rights of minorities and women.105 As in the political arena, the Iraqi 
government had made some advances in its economic policy, but 
continued to face challenges. Ambassador Crocker observed that Iraq 
had allocated $13 billion for reconstruction and that the United States 
would no longer be funding major infrastructure projects.106 He also 
noted that Iraq would increasingly use its own funds to support 
projects developed by the United States, such as Iraq’s commitment 
of $200 million in support of a program to provide vocational 
training for local concerned citizens who had opposed militia 
groups.107 Ambassador Crocker determined that as with the process 
of political reconciliation, “Iraq’s economy [remained] fragile, the 
gains reversible and the challenges ahead substantial.”108 Despite 
these challenges, Ambassador Crocker stated that the progress he had 
seen in Iraq led him to believe that “the strategy that began with the 
Surge is working.”109 He cautioned that while U.S. support would 
remain critical that did not mean that U.S. support should be “open-
ended” or that the “level and nature of our engagement should not 
diminish over time.”110
During his testimony, General Petraeus provided an overview of 
the security situation in Iraq following the build up of the surge.111 
He reported that: 
as the Iraqi Accordance Front) has re-joined the government. See Sudarsan 
Raghavan, Sunni Bloc Rejoins Iraqi Government, Amid Reconciliation Hopes, 
WASH. POST, July 20, 2008, at A12 (crediting Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki with the return of the Iraqi Accordance Front, which rejoined the 
government partly because they viewed Maliki’s crack down on Shiite militias in 
Basra as a sign that he was not sectarian). 
 105. See Crocker Statement, April 2008, supra note 99, at 6-7. 
 106. Id. at 8. 
 107. Id. at 9. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 5. 
 110. Id. 
 111. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, 
Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee (Apr. 8, 2008), available 
at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2008/April/Petraeus%2004-08-08.pdf. 
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[s]ince September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have 
been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of 
other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows, the 
capabilities of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown . . . . 
Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still 
unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain . . . the 
progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible . . . . 
still, security in Iraq is better than it was when Ambassador 
Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is 
significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was 
on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy 
additional US forces to Iraq.112
General Petraeus noted that in addition to the U.S. surge, the Iraqis 
had also conducted a surge, adding over 100,000 additional soldiers 
and police to the ISF in 2007.113 He attributed the security 
improvements to the increased numbers and capability of the ISF, as 
well as the carrying out of counterinsurgency operations by Coalition 
and Iraqi forces, and the attitudinal shift among certain elements of 
the Iraqi population against Al-Qaeda Iraq’s (AQI) “indiscriminate 
violence and extremist ideology.”114 He believed that this was most 
evident in the fact that tens of thousands of Iraqis – including former 
insurgents – had chosen to contribute to local security as “Sons of 
Iraq.”115 In his view, their assistance had helped to significantly 
reduce the threat posed by AQI.116 He also cited the fall 2007 
ceasefire declaration by Moqtada al-Sadr, the Shiite militia leader, as 
another factor in the overall reduction of violence.117 In his view, the 
greatest long term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq would 
continue to be Iran’s funding, training, arming, and directing of 
“Special Groups” in Iraq that engage in violent activity.118
In General Petraeus’ view, the nature of the conflict in Iraq 
continued to be a competition among ethnic and sectarian groups for 
power and resources and that various elements—terrorists, 
 112. Id. at 1. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 2. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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insurgents, militia extremists, and gangs—continued to push that 
competition toward violence. Nonetheless, he argued that most 
parties realized that the only rational way ahead was through political 
dialogue, rather than violent street-fighting.119 Despite his view that 
Iraq remained a violent country, General Petraeus also cited some 
statistics to indicate that progress had been achieved in the area of 
security. He stated that for almost six months, security incidents had 
been at a “level not seen since early-to-mid-2005.”120 He also stated 
that Iraqi civilian deaths had decreased over the past year to a level 
not seen since the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing which 
had set off the devastating cycle of sectarian violence seen in 2006 
and early 2007.121
General Petraeus also reported that the ISF continued to develop 
and that the coalition had been able to transfer the security 
responsibility of more provinces to the ISF. As of the time of his 
testimony, security responsibility for 9 out of 18 Iraqi provinces had 
been transferred from coalition control to Iraqi control.122 He also 
reported that the ISF had grown by 133,000 soldiers and the Iraqi 
police services had grown over the past 16 months to more than 
540,000 individuals.123 He stated that more than 100 Iraqi combat 
battalions were capable of taking the lead in operations with coalition 
support.124 Although greatly improved, General Petraeus determined 
that the ISF were not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security 
throughout the country on their own and he believed that the 
improved security remained vulnerable to a resurgence of AQI, a 
violation of Moqtada’s ceasefire by Shi’a groups, and further stoking 
of violence by Iran and other external actors.125
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 4 (emphasizing that these provinces include not only the successful 
Kurdish provinces but also “a number of Southern provinces”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 5 (asserting that these external factors include Iran and actions by 
other neighbors that could undermine the security situation). 
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CONCLUSION 
In his April testimony, General Petraeus assessed that the surge in 
conjunction with several other factors, including Moqtada al Sadr’s 
ceasefire and the new alliance between the “Sons of Iraq” and  
MNF-I against insurgents brought improvement to the security 
environment in Iraq in 2007.126 Nonetheless, the Government of 
Iraq’s ability to capitalize on these security gains was sporadic. The 
passage of key political reconciliation measures at the national level 
was slow and for many measures, remained unrealized. 
The premise of the New Way Forward was that increased military 
troop numbers and counterinsurgency operations by the coalition and 
Iraqi forces would help drive down sectarian violence, enabling the 
Iraqi political leadership to enter into compromise “benchmark” 
measures that would foster greater political reconciliation among 
Iraq’s various sectarian groups. This premise placed extreme 
pressure on the coalition forces to improve security, sometimes with 
the ISF in the lead, and on the American Mission to convince Iraqi 
leaders to pass legislative and other initiatives in an environment 
where, Ambassador Crocker once noted, “the Washington clock 
seems to be running a lot faster than the Baghdad clock.”127 This task 
came at a period of transition in Iraq—a period in which the former 
American—led occupation authority, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, had been replaced by a democratically elected Iraqi 
government and the coalition forces had begun to transfer greater 
security responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces. 
In essence, the New Way Forward called for greater U.S. 
diplomatic and military pressure to achieve results on the ground in 
Iraq at the same time that the coalition forces and the embassy had 
the obligation to support the Iraqi Government as the sovereign 
political authority and, increasingly, as the lead in ensuring the 
protection of its citizenry. To prove the New Way Forward a success, 
the U.S. military and diplomatic corps were required to demonstrate 
 126. See id. at 1-2. 
 127. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Press Roundtable, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad 
(May 18, 2007), available at http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20070518_round 
table.html. 
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to Congress greater and more specific political, military, and 
economic accomplishments, but had to rely upon the Iraqi 
Government to ensure that the benchmark measures of success were 
achieved. 
As the New Way Forward strategy recognized, the Iraqi 
Government must reach a point where it can govern independently 
and take on security responsibility for its nation. The U.S. 
government can play a role in helping the Iraqi government reach 
this end state but the question remains—how long can the success of 
the U.S. mission in Iraq be measured by the Iraqi government’s 
ability to meet benchmarks? In a post-surge environment, new 
measurements for success in Iraq will need to be developed as the 
U.S. strategy in Iraq is again updated and modified to reflect the 
ever-changing environment in Iraq. 
 
 
 
